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Decentralization is widely recognized as the property and one of most important advantage of blockchain
over legacy systems. However, decentralization is often discussed on the consensus layer and recent
research shows the trend of centralization on several subsystem of blockchain. In this project, we
measured centralization of Bitcoin and Ethereum on source code, development eco-system, and network
node levels. We found that the programming language of project is highly centralized, code clone is very
common inside Bitcoin and Ethereum community, and developer contribution distribution is highly
centralized. We further discuss how could these centralizations lead to security issues in blockchain. Our
work can also provide some empirical background for future security analysis on blockchain systems.
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Abstract—Decentralization is widely recognized as the property and one of most important advantage of blockchain over
legacy systems. However, decentralization is often discussed
on the consensus layer and recent research shows the trend
of centralization on several subsystem of blockchain. In this
project, we measured centralization of Bitcoin and Ethereum
on source code, development eco-system, and network node
levels. We found that the programming language of project is
highly centralized, code clone is very common inside Bitcoin
and Ethereum community, and developer contribution distribution is highly centralized. We further discuss how could these
centralizations lead to security issues in blockchain. Our work
can also provide some empirical background for future security
analysis on blockchain systems.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Ethereum, Bitcoin, Security, Decentralization

I. Introduction
Recent years have witnessed the uprising of cryptocurrencies with a market capitalization of $220 B [1]
against traditional currency. Comparing to the traditional
currency system, one of the most significant advantage
of cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum is that
they are running on top of blockchain, which is widely
considered as a decentralized system. Much of the current
research focus on only the consensus layer to ensure the
incentive structure is set up to enable decentralization
with correctness guarantee. However, as with all other
computing systems, decentralized system relies on several
layers of computing to function, from hardware to software, from individual node to network, from incentization
to applications based on consensus. In this project, we conducted a measure and analysis on some of the layer. To be
more specific, we measure the (de)centralization of source
code, (de)centralization of developer, (de)centralization
of network node. We found the code contribution and
language distribution is highly centralized behind the
blockchain eco-system and large percentage of blockchain
related project contains similar code snippets. These findings indicate that heavy centralization at various crucial
layers of a distributed system which would significantly
impact the security of system eventually.
II. Centralization on Source Code
A. Methodology
To understand how centralized the source code is within
the whole blockchain eco-system, we first download 4606

repositories marked as in Bitcoin topic and 7362 repositories marked as in Ethereum topic from world biggest VCS
GitHub. we filter out repositories which are least important to Bitcoin and Ethereum whose star number and fork
number on GitHub is less than 5. After that, by manually
go through all repositories’ description and README file,
we remove some repositories which are not relevant to
Bitcoin and Ethereum and add some repositories which are
actually important to bitcoin and Ethereum eco-system
despite they have few stars and forks. Then we have our
repositories dataset as 1539 Bitcoin related repositories
and 2319 Ethereum related repositories. We measure
centralization of source code from two important project
properties: programming language and code similarity. To
determine the programming language of project, we use
Linguist developed by GitHub to identify the most used
language within a single repository and mark it as the
language of project. To quantify the similarity between two
repositories marked as using same language, we first use
our similarity comparison tool to find similar code block
between two repositories. Then we use Jaccard Similarity
Coefficient to calculate the similarity score.
Jaccard(A, B) =
Sim(A, B) =

∥A ∩ B∥
∥A ∪ B∥

LOC(Sim(A)) + LOC(Sim(B))
LOC(A) + LOC(B)

(1)
(2)

The similarity score between two repositories which
marked as different language is assigned to zero. Since
similarity comparison through all files in all repositories
would be very time-consuming, we only make the similarity comparison on the top 100 forked repositories for
both Ethereum and Bitcoin repositories as they are good
representative of highquality project.
B. Results
1) Centrality of Project Language: From dataset mentioned above, we plot the language distribution of Bitcoin
and Ethereum repositories separately. The Figure 1 and 2
only shows the top 20 languages in the purpose of better
visualization. As we can observe from them, language
of Bitcoin related projects is centralized in JavaScript
and Python, and language of Ethereum related projects
is most centralized in JavaScript. Comparing to the
language distribution of 2019 [2], we can clearly find out

Bitcoin Related Repositories Most Common Language

Most Common Language in 2019
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Percentage of Number

that in the language distribution of the whole software
development’s curve is more flatten , in other words, more
decentralized than our decentralized blockchain system.
As one of the most clearly phenomenon shows in the figure
3, blockchain related project heavily relies on JavaScript
than general software. This give attacker the possibility of
taking control the majority of blockchain by only targeting
JavaScript.
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Fig. 3: Language Distribution of 2019
10

5

0

ir
ix
El

R
a
al
e
Sc rfil
ke
oc
D
n
tli
Ko
SS
C
st
Ru
l
el
Sh

C
ift
Sw
L
TM
H
by pt
Ru cri
S
pe
Ty

#
C
P
PH
va
Ja
++
C

o
G n
o
t
th
Py crip
S
va
Ja

for better visualization. The uncolored nodes which are
also discrete nodes means no code clone founded in this
repositories. In Figure 4, we have 47 out of 100 repositories
contain similar code blocks. In Figure 5, we have 56 out
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Fig. 1: Bitcoin Related Project Language Distribution
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Fig. 2: Ethereum Related Project Language Distribution
2) Similarity of Project Source Code: In both Figure
4 and Figure 5, we graph the similarity of project source
code. Each node represent a repository and edge between
two nodes indicates two repositories contains similar code
blocks. Thickness of edge is determined by the similarity
score: if one edge is thicker than another means these
two repositories are more similar than other. The node
size is determined by the node degree. So the bigger
node means this have more similarity connection than
other nodes. All connected nodes are in the same color

Fig. 4: Bitcoin Related Project Similarity Graph
of 100 repositories contain similar code blocks. Further
comparing across Figure 4 and Figure 5, we can find
overall similarity of Ethereum is higher not only because
they have more colored node but also because they have
more connected nodes. We can see a lot of dark blue
nodes at the center of this picture. Although, we did
not make similarity comparsion on all repositories due to
the time restriction, the code clone situation of remaining

repositories are imaginable worse than these high-quality
project. So the conclusion that blockchain related project
faces problem of code clone is still solid.

Fig. 5: Ethereum Related Project Similarity Graph
III. Centralization on Development Eco-System
A. Methodology
We use the repositories dataset above and build a
contribution dataset by mapping each commit to a specific
contributor. The detail of mapping is discussed in the
Difficulties part. To calculate the contribution made by
developer within single repositories we use Equation 3
proposed by Xu [3].
LOC(i)
Commit(i)
Contri(i) = ∑n
+ ∑n
LOC(k)
k=1
k=1 Commit(k)

(3)

LOC(i, j)
Commit(i, j)
Contri(i, j) = ∑n
+ ∑n
LOC(k)
k=1
k=1 Commit(k, j)
(4)

made to whole development eco-system. Therefore, we use
another fork number weighted version of equation 1 as
Equation 4 and 5 to calculate contribution to the whole
development eco-system made by developer. Contri(i, j)
means developer i’s contribution in j repository. p is the
total number of developer i have contributed.
Then we analyze the centralization on development
Eco-System from two perspective: centrality of developer contribution in single project and centrality of
developer contribution across projects. For centrality in
single project we choose the most the popular repository “bitcoin/bitcoin” and “ethereum/go-ethereum” from
each Bitcoin community and Ethereum community. “bitcoin/bitcoin” is not only the most popular repository
which have 43.1k stars and 25.6k forks on GitHub, but
also one of most important repositories among Bitcoin
development eco-system, it develops the official code of
bitcoin core component. It is the source of bitcoin system
and source of decentralized blockchain system.
As for “ethereum/go-ethereum” which have 25.8k stars
and 9.4k forks on GitHub is the official implementation of
the Ethereum protocol, it contains multiple small project
including official Ethereum client geth, core Ethereum
protocol and EVM. Those projects together built the
Ethereum and made Ethereum as so called blockchain 2.0.
The result of these two projects is a good representation
of other repositories.
For centrality across projects, we analyze two datasets.
One of them is the original contribution dataset made
by all repositories inside the repositories dataset for both
Bitcoin and Ethereum, another is a contribution dataset
made by top 100 forked repositories inside the repositories
dataset for both bitcoin and Ethereum. The necessity
of latter one is that there may be a lot of developer
who only have slightly interest into blockchain. They
only commit one time and never come back again. Those
developer could give us false impression of centrality
by increasing large number of contributors with small
amount of contributions. To mitigate this issue, we need
the latter dataset as the contributor of the top 100
forked repositories can be referred as developers who have
continuous interest in blockchain.
B. Results

1) Centrality of Developer Contribution in Single
Contri(i, j) × F orks(j)
Project:
The development contribution of these two
W _Contri(i) =
Contri(j,
k)
×
F
orks(k)
0<j≤m,0<j≤n
projects
is
not decentralized as the blockchain system
j=1
(5) or at least it claims to be as we can see from Figure 6 and Figure 71 . To be more precisely, for “bitThis equation takes both number of lines of code have
coin/bitcoin”, GitHub user “lannwj” alone made 34.25%
been modified and numbers of commits into account is
of total contribution. And top 50 contributors together
considered to be more precise compared to choosing only
made 83.37% of total contribution while remaining 761
one of them.
Since more fork number of a repository means more
1 The contributor’s ID in figure is the first 5 characters of GitHub
project developed on top of it, the fork number can be Handle, if contributor can not associated to a GitHub account, it’s
a good indicator of how much contribution a repository ID is the the first 5 characters of Email address
p
∑

∑

Top 20 Contributor's Contribution in 'bitcoin/bitcoin' Project
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this curve is. We can use the area between real world curve
and decentralized distribution curve as a indicator of level
of centrality. Based on that we can observe from Figure 8
and 9, the contribution distribution is more centralized if
it is weighted and even it is not weighted it is still highly
centralized. Weighted top 100 result is slightly less centralized than the across all result as we predict in methodology
part, but their all still highly centralized comparing to the
idealistic decentralized distribution curve. One interesting
finding is that the Bitcoin development eco-system is more
centralized than Ethereum’s, if we compare across these
two figures.
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Fig. 6: “bitcoin/bitcoin” contribution distribution
developer together merely contributed 16.63%. Analogously, for “ethereum/go-ethereum”, GitHub user “obscure”,“karalabe”,“fj” and “CJentzsc” each made 35.375%
, 14.49%, 12.395%, 11.005% of total contribution. And
top 50 contributors together made 96.09% of total contribution while remaining 428 developer together merely
contributed 3.91%.
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Fig. 8: Bitcoin Related Project Contribution Distribution
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Fig. 7: “ethereum/go-ethereum” contribution distribution
2) Centrality of Developer Contribution Across Project:
To better visualize how centralized those distribution is,
we use cumulative percentage of contributors as x axis
and cumulative percentage of contribution as y axis. We
also add an idealistic decentralized distribution curve as
a reference. We can clearly observe the inequality of
contribution distribution from both Figure 8 and Figure
9. It is obvious that the most contribution are made by
only small number of developers in both development ecosystem. Since the more one curve fit to the idealistic
decentralized distribution curve, the more decentralized
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Fig. 9: Ethereum Related Project Contribution Distribution
IV. Centrality on Network Node
In the aspect of network node, previous work have
successfully measure bandwidth latency, peer-to-peer latency [4], node geographic location etc. In this project

we measure its centrality from node security perspective.
We want to find out whether there exist common security
vulnerabilities across Ethereum nodes’s host machine. We
collected 11927 nodes with 15156 IPs from ethnode.org
website. We tried use shodan port scan data to find common vulnerability but shodan only contain information
about 2898 nodes with 2657 IPs. And the data from
shodan shows 627 vulnerable IP in total and 400 of them
are ssh username enumeration, 167 of them are remote
code execution, 36 of them are denial of service and 13
of them are directory traversal. We believe ssh username
enumeration is not a severe security vulnerability and the
shodan dataset are too small compared to the number
of node we collected. The result cannot provide useful
insight.
V. Difficulties
A. Collecting repositories from GitHub
To collect repositories dataset mentioned above, we
need to download all projects whose topic marked as
Bitcoin or Ethereum. GitHub API [5] provides simple
method to request the search by constructing a query
with topic qualifier, however, the returned result is always
not completed. After carefully examining GitHub API
documentation, we found GitHub API will only return the
first 1000 matched results per query. To resolve this issue,
we construct our query carefully and limit the number of
matched results. There are few qualifiers we can used in
the query such as repository size, number of forks, number
of stars, when a repository was created or last updated.
However, considering we are interacting with an active
system, the repository size, number of forks, number of
stars or last updated date can change dynamically, the
only static qualifier we can use is the date of creation.
In order to make sure each the number of repositories
within a specific date interval does exceed 1000, we
use binary search to build date interval correctly and
quickly. By using this approach, we successfully collected
4606 repositories with topic marked as Bitcoin and 7362
repositories 2 with topic marked as Ethereum.
B. Mapping commits to contributor
After we clone all repositories into local hard drive
using method described above. We are trying to map
the commits to each unique contributor. According to
the Git specification [6], Git allow user to change their
name and email at will which means, it is highly possible
a single person using multiple alias and how to merging
those alias is a big problem. Fortunately, GitHub assigns
a unique ID for each user associated with an GitHub
account. To retrieve author’s ID of one commit, we only
need to request the detail of commit based on commit
SHA through GitHub API. However, if we request for
all commits from GitHub API, it will be very time
2 Repositories

data is collected in Dec 2019

consuming since GitHub have restriction on request times
over a period of time we will lose our time on waiting.
To reduce the total request time, we build an emailto-id lookup table. We first query GitHub API to get
contributors list and contributor’s public email for each
repository. Based on GitHub API documentation, if user
choose to keep their address private, the commit email
will show as ′ id+username@users.no−reply.github.com′
or ′ username@users.no − reply.github.com′ . So, we also
construct those two email address and mapped them to
GitHub ID. Then we use Git log command to get the
commit details and matching its email against the emailto-id lookup table. If author’s email cannot be found
in the lookup table, we then query the API and get
the information for this specific commit. Through this
approach, we successfully match 26336 email address from
total 30223 email address to 21085 GitHub account in
10 hours. The unmatched 4950 address partially cause
by GitHub user changing username with using GitHub
provided no-reply email address at same time [7]. After we
done the picking mentioned in Centralization on Source
Code’s methodology, we have 3858 repositories in total
and have 21898 email address associated with 18204
GitHub account.
VI. Security Impact
Why is centralization bad? The intention of building a
decentralized system is to make sure the fairness of each
node. All node should be treated exactly as the consensus
claims and not a single node can impact the system
through a method that is not mentioned or acknowledged
in the consensus. However, centralization gives some
nodes or entities the possibility to influence other nodes
or system against the consensus’s will. Therefore, the
consensus is broken and system is in jeopardy.
A. Impact of centralization in source code
If attack want to attack a decentralized system programmed in all kinds of language, they will need the
power to find different vulnerabilities so they can attack
51% of the system to make it work. In contrast, the
centrality of programming language could give attacker
the advantage to impact large scale of blockchain network
only exploits the vulnerability inside the JavaScript or
Python. The level of difficulties of finding vulnerabilities
inside one or two language is way lower than finding
vulnerabilities for multiple languages. The code clone
situation in the similarity of project source code make
it even worse as attacker may only need to target some
widely used libraries. The Parity Wallet Hack incident in
2017 is a great real-life example. It is cause by a simple
bug written inside a library that Parity multi-sig contract
called. Anyone used the Parity wallet or wallet which also
used this library was affected. Eventually this hack allowed
an attacker to steal over 150,000 ETH [8].

B. Impact of centralization in developer contribution
Another centralization we found is the centrality in
development team. Speaking of security, human is always
a key factor since they always make mistake deliberately
or accidently. This is exactly why the DAO(Decentralized
Autonomous Organization) merges. Its goal is to codify
the rules and decision making process of an organization,
eliminating the need for documents and people in governing, creating a structure with decentralized control.
The DAO once raised over $150m from more than 11,000
enthusiastic members [9]. However they put too much
attention on the desiging a system which can not be
interfered by human factor but they neglect the developer
who actually implemented system. A simple reentrancy
bug [10] written by the development team allowed attacker to stole 3.6 million ether. What make things more
interesting is the development who wrote this bug not
only known this bug but also made a patch few days
before the DAO attack. They even wrote a blog about
how they patch this bug and claimed, ”The important
takeaway from this is: as there is no ether whatsoever
in the DAO’s rewards account — this is NOT an issue
that is putting any DAO funds at risk today.” [11] As
the developer’s incapability of writing correct and secure
code is the direct reason of this attack, the negligence
of importance of developers is the ultimate reason. Code
written by a small group of developer increase the risk in
security since it will magnifier both developer’s stupidity
and cleverness. As they may be too stupid to write secure
code or clever enough for colluding on stealing other’s
assest. Furthermore, developer tends to reuse code or
coding logic from one project their wrote to another
project they are working on. This could result in more
severe code clone situation and endanger the system in a
directly way.
VII. Limitation
Although we found some centralization on some level of
the decentralized blockchain system, there are still some
limitation on our work. In our work of measuring the centrality of project language, we use the primary language as
the language of project and neglect other language occurs
in the project. And such negligence could increase the
centrality of language distribution. Except that, in the
measurement of centrality of code contribution, we use
lines of code in the equation of calculating contribution.
However, each programming has its own characteristic and
the importance of 1000 lines of C++ code is not the
same as 1000 lines of Python code. This could increase
or decrease the centrality of code contribution.
VIII. Conclusions
In this project, we measure the centrality of blockchain
from centralization on source code, centralization on
development eco-system and centralization on network
node. We found that the programming language of Bitcoin

is centralized in JavaScript and Python while the programming language of Ethereum is centralized in JavaScript.
We measured the code similarity across top 100 forked
repositories in both Bitcoin and Ethereum and found
47% of Bitcoin and 56% Ethereum project have code
clone problem. For the Bitcoin and Ethereum development
team, we found most contribution are made by the only
a small group of developer. We tried to find common
security vulnerability on the Ethereum network node, but
data sample is too small to make insightful conclusion.
We successfully found centralization on some layer of the
blockchain system. Furthermore, our work can provide
some empirical background for future security analysis on
blockchain systems.
Acknowledgment
This is a sub-project of a joint research conducted with
Griffn Shaw from Washington University in St. Louis
and Yang Xiao from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University. Thanks to the guidance and advice
from Professor Ning Zhang and Yang Xiao. This paper is
written during the COVID-19 pandemic. Special thanks
to all those who keep us safe and healthy.
References
[1] Cryptocurrency
market.
[Online].
Available:
https://www.tradingview.com/markets/cryptocurrencies/globalcharts/
[2] B. Putano. (2019) A look at 5 of the most popular
programming languages of 2019. [Online]. Available:
https://stackify.com/popular-programming-languages-2018/
[3] X. Ben, S. Beijun, and Y. Weicheng, “Mining developer contribution in open source software using visualization techniques,”
in 2013 Third International Conference on Intelligent System
Design and Engineering Applications, 2013, pp. 934–937.
[4] A. E. Gencer, S. Basu, I. Eyal, R. van Renesse, and E. G. Sirer,
“Decentralization in bitcoin and ethereum networks,” 2018.
[5] Github api v3 | github developer guide. [Online]. Available:
https://developer.github.com/v3/
[6] Git - documentation. [Online]. Available: https://gitscm.com/doc
[7] Setting your commit email address - github help. [Online].
Available:
https://help.github.com/en/github/setting-upand-managing-your-github-user-account/setting-your-commitemail-address
[8] S. Palladino. (2017) The parity wallet hack explained. [Online].
Available: https://blog.openzeppelin.com/on-the-parity-walletmultisig-hack-405a8c12e8f7/
[9] D. Siegel. (2016) Understanding the dao attack. [Online].
Available: https://www.coindesk.com/understanding-dao-hackjournalists
[10] P. Daian. (2016) Analysis of the dao exploit. [Online]. Available: https://hackingdistributed.com/2016/06/18/analysis-ofthe-dao-exploit/
[11] S. Tual. (2016) No dao funds at risk following the
ethereum smart contract ‘recursive call’ bug discovery.
[Online].
Available:
https://blog.slock.it/no-dao-funds-atrisk-following-the-ethereum-smart-contract-recursive-call-bugdiscovery-29f482d348b

